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BILLS AND NOTES-PROVISIONS AFFECTING NEGOTIABILITY.-In an action
based on a note promising to pay a certain amount "for value received in
one machinery as per contract, November 23, 1899," and (further on) "in case
it becomes necegsary to employ an attorney to collect this note, a further sum,
not exceeding 1o per cent., for fees," the case turned on whether the note
was rendered non-negotiable by these provisions. Held, it was negotiable.
First National Bank of Richmond .v. Badham, 68 S. E. (S. C., 191o) 536.
. As the Negotiable Instruments Law, has not been adopted in South
Carolina, it was necessary to decide the case without reference to that act.
Further than this, there was no decision in that state which satisfactorily covered the points involved. The earlier cases showed quite clearly that the
judges were not of a unit on either point, and it was felt important, therefore,
that this case should settle the doubts on the subject. It can hardly be said
to have done so, however. The judges were two against one in deciding that
the provisions in question did not destroy the negotiability of the note; and
only one of them thought so as to both propositions, having one of his associates with him on the first point and the other on the second. It will thus
be seen that the case is not likely to be a strong one in guiding future decisions. However, it, is submitted that the result. is in accord with the weight
of authority on both points.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Act it is pretty well settled that the
provision as to attorney's fees does not render the amount of the note uncertain, the act providing that "the sum payable is a sum certain within the mean-

ing of this act, although it is to be paid with costs of collection or an attor-

ney's fee, in case payment shall not be made at maturity" (Title I, Art. I,
sect: 2 and sub-sect. 5). This would seem to answer the charge that a stipulation for the payment of an attorney's fee f6r collection after maturity renders
the amount of the note uncertain, and hence destroys its negotiability.
The second point-that "for value received in one machinery as per contract of -November 23" was not a condition operating to make the note nonnegotiable-is more difficult to determine, owing to the facrthat it is largely
a matter of interpretation of the words "as per contract." It was admitted
by the judge, whose opiniotn was adopted, that, had the phrase been "subject
to the contract," or one of similar meaning, the note would not have been
negotiable; and this is undoubtedly true. But he contended, and, it seems,
reasonably, that this was not the proper interpretation of the words used; but
that the plain intent was an expression of the consideration, "the reference
to the contract being manifestly for the purpose of indicating a sale by which
the title to the machinery had to be reserved as a security for the debt," as
provided for further on in the note. "Such a reference to the consideration
and the security does not take away from the paper a single element of a
promissory note," says the judge, and he cites numerous cases supporting his
view, especially three: Markey v. Corey, 1o8 Mich. 184; Bank of Sherman v.
Apperson (C. C.), 4 Fed. 25, and Taylor v. Curry, .o9 Mass. 36, the last of
which decides that a promissory note given to an insurance company is not
rendered non-negotiable by bearing on its face the words "On policy No. 33,386," although the policy contained a provision for the set-off' of notes due
the,company, in case of'a loss. The weight of authority is in accord with our
principal case on this point also. See Daniel's Negotiable' Instruments, § 5Ia,
and cases there cited; also Bigelow's The Law of Bills, Notes and Cheques.
p. 33. As to this question, the Negotiable Instruments Act says, "an unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act,
though coupled with a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the
(102)
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instrument" (Title I, Art. I, sect. 3 and sub-sect. 2). As the act has been
adopted in some of those jurisdictions where there are not cases already
covering the matter, there is little ground for supposing that the question
would have been decided otherwise there; and there are thus only a few
courts which would have probably held the other way, deciding rather on the
construction of the words than the principle involved.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-MARRIAGE-VALID

WHERE

MADE,

VALID EVERY-

wnEme.-The plaintiff in Garcia v. Garcia, 127 N. W. 586 (S. C., igiO), petitioned for the annullment of her marriage to the defendant, her first cousin.
It appeared such a marriage was rendered void under S. C. Civil Code, and
criminal under the Penal Code, but that it was legal under the laws of California, where it was contracted. The court refused to annul the marriage,
holding that it was a universal principle of the law of nations that a marriage
valid where contracted was thereafter valid everywhere.
With two possible exceptions, this proposition seems accepted law. Bishop
on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Sec. 843, Vol. I. "Should there be, as
occasionally may happen, a country or state permitting marriages which by
the common voice of civilized nations are vicious past toleration, such marriages, -hough solemnized under the protection of its laws, would not be within
the protection of the law of nations, because lacking the general favor essential.
Therefore they would be rejected by the tribunals of every other country in
which they were not by its local laws approved." Do: Sec. 857. The court
were of the obinion that for consanguinity to bring a case under this exception the parties would have to be in direct line, or brothers and sisters. With
.the growth of a higher standard of public morality we may look forward
to a time when marriage between first cousins would come under this head.
So in U. S. ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, io7 Fed. 886, it was held that a marriage in Russia between Russian Jews who were uncle and niece, though lawful
where celebrated, would not be recognized as valid in Pennsylvania. The court
conceded the general rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, but said the rule was subject to at least the following exception: "If
the relation, although lawful in the foreign country, is stigmatized as incestuous by the law of Pennsylvania, no rule of comity requires a court sitting in
this state to recognize the foreign marriage as valid." The relation of uncle
and niece is collateral and very little closer than that of cousins.
Where it appears, as it did not in this case, that the parties went to the
foreign state fpr the express purpose of evading the lex domicilii, there is
,some authority that the marriage will be invalid in the home state.
While holding the marriage valid in South Carolina because valid in California where it was contracted, Whiting, P. J., was careful to express no
opinion as to the criminal liabilities under the Penal Code. It" would seem,
however, that the state could not assume the anomalous position of declaring,
through its courts, the marriage valid in a civil action, and then prosecuting
criminally acts done under it which could be criminal, only when not done in
lawful wedlock.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RELIGIous LIBERTY.-The Constitution of Illinois
guarantees the free exercise of religious profession and worship without discrimination and prohibits the appropriation of any public fund in aid of any
sectarian purpose. In one of the school districts of that state a part of the
regular school exercises consisted in the reading of the Bible, the repeating of
the Lord's Prayer, and the singing of hymns. These were declared to be
violative of the above constitutional provisions, and as such were ordered discontinued by the court. People v. Board of Education of District 24, 92 N. E.
(Ill.) 251 (i9io).
The decision was based on the ground that these exervises constitute religious worship, and that the reading of the Bible is equivat to sectarian instruction. Two of the judges dissented, claiming that the
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Bible is not a sectarian book at all, that it is merely the interpretation of it
that is sectarian, and that consequently the mere reading from it cannot
amount to sectarian instruction.
The interpretation of similar constitutional provisions in other states has
been conflicting. In Wisconsin it has been held that the mere reading of the
Bible is in itself sectarian. State v. District Board of School District No. 8,
76 Wis. 177. In Nebraska the question as to whether or not such exercises
amount to sectarian instruction is to be determined by the court from the
facts of each particular case, in pursuance of the rule that the point where
the courts may rightfully interfere to prevent the use of the Bible in a public
school is where legitimate use has degenerated into abuse-where a teacher
employed to give secular instruction has become a sectarian propagandist. In
every other state where constitutional enactments substantially those of Illinois have been interpreted by the Supreme Courts of the states, it has been
held that the Bible is non-sectarian in its entirety, and may therefore be read
without interference in the public schools. Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa, 367;
Hackett v. Brooksville School District, 12o Ky. 6o8; Billard v. Board of Education, 69 Kan. 53; Church v. Bullock, lo9 S. W. (Tex.) 115. The question
has not come up before the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania, but a lower court
has decided that the reading from the King James' Version of the Bible and
the singing of Protestant hymns, where a-room was provided in which Catholic
children might remain during such exercises, was not illegal under a constitutional enactment similar to that in the Illinois case. Hart v. Sharpsville
Borough School District, 2 Chest. Co. 521.
The dissenting opinion in the principal case seems better grounded in reason than the majority decision.
CoNTRActs-AccoRD. AND SATISFACTION-CERTIFICAMrON OF CHECK OPERATING IN ACCORD AND SATIsFAcioN.-The case of Scheffenacker v. Hoopes,

77 At. 130 (Md., ipso), is valuable as a decision of practical business importance. In a dispute over the amount due for certain printing the defendant
sent the plaintiff a check for half the amount claimed by the latter, stipulating
that it was payment in full and that the plaintiff must return it if he chose
not to use it. Plaintiff never cashed the check, but had it certified at the
bank upon which it was drawn. In an action to recover the balance of the
claim, held, this was such use of the check as to constitute an acceptance of
it in full accord and satisfaction.
It is generally settled law that the certification of a check is an acceptance
of it and operates as payment by the drawer on the theory that upon certification the bank becomes the holder's debtor and acknowledges that funds have
been placed to the credit of the holder. First Nat'l Bank v. Leach, 52 N. Y.
350; Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn Township, 39 Pa. St. 92. Where the
drawer himself causes the check to be certified this does not operate as payment, but merely shifts the immediate liability to pay cash. The debtor would
still be liable if the bank failed before payment. Born v. First Nat'l Bank,
123 Ind. 78. Nor does the creditor, in the absence of an express stipulation
to the contrary, lose his right to demand payment of his claim in money. Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366. These cases merely limit the general doctrine
and are not in conflict with it, for it can well be argued that where the holder
has the check certified he thereby accepts an implied condition to waive an
actual present cash payment. In view of this state of the law the decision
under discussion would seem in accord with the general trend of authority.
It is but a step farther to hold certification a good use of a check operating
as accord and satisfaction, and the conclusion is reached by applying the principles mentioned to a new situation. It is therefore on its practical, not its
legal side, that the case attracts attention. The cases bearing directly on the
question under discussion are few, but note in accord St: Regis Paper Co. v.
Tonawanda Paper Co., io7 App. Div. go (N. Y., 19o5).
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COR.PORATIONS-INCoRPORATION FOR PURPOSE OF PRACTISING LAw.-The

Co-Operative Law Company was formed "to furnish its subscribers with legal
advice and service, to operate in connection with the above a department of
law and collections for the use and benefit of the subscribers of the company
only-and to accomplish these objects said company proposes to employ and
maintain a -staff of competent attorneys and counsellors-at-law to give such
advice." A certificate of approval was given this company by the Appellate
Division Supreme Court in June, I9io, which was ordered vacated by that
body four months later. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the vacation
order. In re Co-Operative Law Co., 92 N. E. 15 (N. Y., x91o). Cited with
approval, In re Bensel, z24 N. Y. S. 726.
A statute has recently been enacted in New York making it a misdemeanor
for any corporation "to practise law, render or furnish legal services or
advice, furnish attorneys or counsellors for that purpose, or advertise for or
solicit legal business." Penal Laws, § 280, c. 483 Laws of x9og. This statute
would, of course, effectually prevent any further attempt at incorporation,
but as the application was made prior to this statute the company's counsel
(it did not plead its own cause) claimed the right to incorporate under the
clause allowing this privilege for "any lawful purpose." As no state except
New York expressly forbids a corporation practising law, and as nearly all
the states have the above act as to lawful business, the remarks of the court
on this subject are particularly interesting.
"Business," says the court, "in its ordinary sense is what is meant by these
provisions-not the calling of members of the great professions which have
always been subject to peculiar difficulties and responsibilities. Requisites
for admission to the bar, such as study, examinations, registration, etc., are
peculiarly personal and cannot be fulfilled by a corporation. The relation of
attorney and client, moreover, is a very close and private one involving the
highest trust and confidence, nor could it but tend to degrade the bar to make
some of its members subject to a money-making corporation, acting not for
the advancement of justice, but for its own sordid interests."
We have, therefore, in this case authority for denying the right of incorporation to a body intending to practise law and wishing to incorporate under
the usual statutes. While this is the first decision on the subject, there are
cases analogous in doctrine forbidding the practise of medicine or dentistry
by a corporation. People v. Woodbury Dermatological Inst, 192 N. Y.
454; Hannon v. Siegal-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y. 244. In accord see language
of Weiss, P. J., in a Pennsylvania case: "The right to practice dentistry could
not be declared from the language 'to engage in any other lawful business
of any kind or character.'" Comm. v. Alba Dentist Co., 13 Pa. Dist. Rep.
432.
Whether the object be medicine or law the same reasoning applies, and
the result is and should be the same under the well-known principle that no
corporation will be incorporated where its purpose is uncertain or doubtful, or
where it may be perverted to improper or unworthy purposes, injurious to
morals and the public welfare. In re Chinese Club, I Pa. Dist. Rep. 84. The
New York Supreme Court is to be congratulated on its decision, which cannot but commend itself to all truly interested in the advancement of the bar.
CRInEs-SusPENSIO

F Civi. RaEmDY.--The Mayor and City Council of

Baltimore brought action against a former clerk in the office of the register
of the Mayor and City Council for some $24,ooo, alleged to have been stolen
by the defendant while in this office. At the same time prosecution for the
identical larceny, was instituted in the Criminal Court of the City of Baltimore. The civil suit came into the Court of Appeals of Maryland on an
appeal from a judgment overruling the defendant's motion to quash an attachment on original process while the criminal prosecution was still pending. In
this situation the appellant contended that under Section 261, Article 27 of
the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, which provides that "every
person convicted of larceny of the value of $5 or upwards shall restore the
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money, goods or thing taken to the original owner, or pay the full value
thereof and be sentenced to the penitentiary," etc., a special jurisdiction is
conferred upon the criminal courts of the state in all matters of restitution
in larceny, "the restoration of the goods or their value being predicated on
conviction and being part of the punishment prescribed, and the said courts
having exclusive jurisdiction of all felonies committed within the bounds of
their authority." But the 6ourt did not adopt this view, holding that the
restoration of the property was a part of the judgment to be entered, but
not punishment prescribed, and was designed to effect an immediate restoration of any of the stolen property in the custody of the court or state's officer,
without necessity of recourse to a civil suit for its recovery. A contrary rule
would withhold from the real owner until the conviction of the thief, the civil
remedy to recover the property stolen or its value, and it could not be supposed
that this was the design of the Legislature. Downs v. Mayor, etc., of City
of Baltimore, 76 Atlantic, 86i.
In thus deciding, the court has followed the rule almost universally adopted
in the United States. In England the doctrine of the suspension of civil remedy in the case of felony seems to have been favored in some of the earlier
cases, but there is little of decisive authority to support it and in a comparatively recent case the court remarked that it was exploded, though the decision did not turn directly on that point. Midland Ins. Co. v.,Smith, L. R. 6,
Q. B. D. 56z. However, it is easy to account for the origin of such a doctrine in that country. In feudal times and even later, when all felonies were
punished by death and the property of the felon was forfeited to the crown,
a civil action would be of no avail. Where proceedings were instituted by the
voluntary action of the party injured by the crime, the "policy of the law
required that before the party injured by any felonious act could seek civil
redress for it, the matter should be heard and disposed of before the proper
criminal tribunal in order that the justice of the country may be first satisfied
in respect to the public offence." Lord Ellenborough in Crosby v. Leng, 12
East. 409.
It was inevitable that some of the early decisions on this point in the
United States should be contradictory. But the institution of public prosecutors and the much greater leniency in the punishment of felons seemed to
furnish the court good reasons for discarding the old doctrine. Boston &
Worcester R. R. Co. v. Dana, i Gray, 83, repudiated the early rule in Massachusetts. Pettingill v. Rideout, 6 N.. H. 454, overthrowing Grafton Bank
v. Flanders, 4 N. H. 239, did the same thing in New Hampshire. Ballew v.
Alexander, 6 Humph. Tenn. 433, follows Massachusetts, as does Hyatt v.
Adams, i6 Mich. 18o. Plummer v. Webb, et aL, I Ware, 69, calls the rule
"a relic of feudal times."
In Pennsylvania, by Act of March 31, 186o, P. L. 44s, civil actions may
be maintained against felons in like manner as if offence "had not been
'feloniously done," and New York has a similar statute. Allison v. Farmers'
Bank, 6. Rand, Va. 223, disapproves the rule. Some states have not been
so positive. In Georgia if the injury amounted to a felony as described by
the code, there must be a simultaneous, previous or concurrent prosecution .for
the crime. Sawtell v. Western & Atlantic R. R. Co., 61 Ga. 567; but by the
Act of August 27, 1879, no prosecution for the tort as a felony need be shown
in order to recover for it ap a civil injury.- New Jersey allows the party to
institute proceedings in damages, -but not "bring on the trial in advance of.
public duty." McBlain v. Edgar, 48 Atlantic, 6oo. Thus some courts merely
modify the rule which others do not countenance, and the latter seem to be
supported by reason and the great weight of authority.
CRIMEs--SuIcm-In McMahan v. St., 53 So. Rep. 89 (19io Ala.)
defendant was convicted of murder and appealed. The deceased was shot and
the prosecution contended that the defendant purposely shot him. The defendant
testified that he and the deceased, had agreed that they should both kill them-
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selves, and it was in the execution of this agreement that deceased met death.
Upon this part of the evidence the court instructed the jury that if the death of
the deceased was self inflicted, and was the result of a compact between him and
the defendant. that each take his own life, the defendant as survivor was guilty
of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and
held that the defendant was a principal in the second degree to murder.
The defendant's guilt was made to depend upon the fact that he was
a principal in the second degree to a felony, and the interesting question is, if
suicide is a felony what felony is it? If suicide is murder, then of course,
the defendant is a principal in the second degree of murder. It was looked
upon as murder at the common law as far back as Bracton and carried with
a punishment for its commission, viz. forfeiture of estate. But, since with us
forfeiture of estate does not penalize the felon, and since the dead cannot be
punished, the law' is confronted with a felony for the commission of which it
has ascribed no corresponding punishment. This should, however, make it none
the less criminal, because guilt is the ground of punishment and not punishment
of guilt. 2 Pol. & Mait. Hist. Evg. Law. 475 n. It most nearly resembles
fiurder, for it has all the elements of murder-the killing of a reasonable
creature, the malice, and the forethought.
In Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (I8x6), the court holds self destruction
murder, and therefore one who aids or abets in the commission of the act is
guilty of murder, and in the State v. Lavelle, 34 S. C. 120 (i8go), practically
the same thing is held. In Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 42 (1878), it is held
that one who in attempting suicide, accidentally kills another, is guilty of
manslaughter and possibly murder yet they add that since the statute makes
felonies only those crimes which are punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison, and by death, it might not be a felony in that state. It is difficult to
see the court's reasoning, because in Massachusetts, murder is punishable by
death, and if suicide is murder, then it must be a felony. In Grace v. St, 69
S. W. (Tex.) 529 (19o2), under a statute similar to the one in Massachusetts
the courts hold that since suicide is not a penal offence, aiding and abetting in
its commission is not an unlawful act In some states such as New York,
and some others their penal codes made it a felony to attempt or aid an attempt
to commit suicide, yet they have not provided for the successful attempt It
must, therefore, be conceded that the courts that have held suicide to be murder
have been the most logical, and have kept closer to the English common law.
EQUITY-RIGHT OF

PiuvAc.-James J. Jeffries, having written an auto-

biography, sought to enjoin the defendant from using the name, portrait
or picture of the plaintiff in or, in connection with a so-called biography or
life histqry of the plaintiff. He attempted to bring the case within the
Civil Rights Law (N. Y. Cons. Laws I 3o8). Art V, Sec. 51, which allows
an injunction and damages to "any person whose name, portrait or picture
is used for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the
written consent!- of such person, by alleging that his picture gave deferidant's
newspaper "an increased circulation" and thereby "increased value as an
advertising medium." Whitney, J., held "* * * a picture is not used for
advertising purposes * * * unless it is part of an advertisement, while
"trade" refers to "commerce or traffic' not to the dissemination of information." Injunction denied. Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal, 124 N. Y.
Supp. 780.
The question of the existence of a right of privacy in this connection
is a comparatively recent one in- the law, due largely to the late development of instantaneous photography. Probably the most important decision on
the subject is that by Judge Parker in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
171 N. Y. 538. In this case the plaintiff, an infant, by her mother, sought to
restrain the unauthorized publication and distribution of lithographic copies of
her photograph in an advertisement for flour. In denying the injunction Judge
Parker said: "There is no precedent for such an action to be found in the

io8
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decisions of this court." "Mention of such a right is not to be found in Blackstone, Kent or any other of the great commentators upon the law." "If such
a principle be incorporated into the body of the law through the instrumentality
of a court of equity, the attempts to logically apply the principle will necessarily
result, not only in a vast amount of litigation but in litigation bordering upon
the absurd, for the right of privacy, once established as a legal doctrine, cannot
be combined to the restraint.of the publication of a likeness but must necessarily
embrace as well the publication of a word picture, a comment upon one's looks,,
conduct, domestic relations or habits." Judge Parker, however, recommended
in this opinion the passage of the statute upon which the leading case is based.
The Roberson case may be taken as generally accepted, if not universal law
to-day. Probably the strangest case contra is that of Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 191, Cobb, J.: "So thoroughly satisfied are we that the
law recognizes within proper limits as a legal right and that the publication of
one's picture without his consent by another as an advertisement * * * is an
invasion of this right that we venture to predict that the day will come when the
American bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges
of eminence and ability." However it will be noticed that in this case the
photograph in question was obtained' without the plaintiff's consent from a
photographer. The decision therefore is in reality based on a property right
and the statements as to the right of privacy are mere dicta.
In Corliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. 434, 64 Fed. 280, the court seems to recognize
a right of privacy in private individuals (for criticism see Judge Parker in
Roberson v. Rochester Box Co., supra) but as the person in question had
impliedly consented to the use of his photograph during his lifetime, it was held
that his relatives could not secure an injunction against its use after his death.
The Jeffries decision may be said to be thoroughly in accord with the
authorities in that it refuses to recognize the right of privacy beyond the narrow
scope of the statute. The property right involved in this case (the fact that
the plaintiff has written an autobiography, the sale of which he alleged would
be injured by the publication of his photograph) was certainly too remote to
warrant the intervention of the court.
For an interesting discussion of the right of privacy see -arv. Law Review
IV. 193. For cases in accord with leading case see Henry v. Cherry & Webb,
73 Atl. 97 (R. I.) ; Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass., 54 Fed.
951; Moser v. Press Pub. Co., iio N. Y. Supp. 963.
EvIDENCE-CROSS-EXAMINATION

OF ACCUSED

IN

CRIMINAL

CAsEs.-The

accused in a murder case in his testimony in chief having neither directly nor
indirectly denied, nor in any way negatived his connection with the beating of
the deceased, but left the subject untouched, it was held error to require him on
cross-examination to answer questions relating to conversations and statements
respecting the beating, and deceased's condition attributable thereto, State v.
Vance, Iio Pac. 434 (Utah, i9io).
Although there is some conflict of opinion as to the scope of the crossexamination of the defendant, the weight of authority and better opinion favors
a broader scope than allowed in this case. Com. v. Mullen, 97 Mass. $45;
Guy v. State, 44 At. (Md.) 977. It is often stated that the accused by taking
the stand places himself in the position of any other witness in respect to the
right of cross-examination. But where an ordinary witness may refuse any
testimony tending to incriminate, the defendant is generally compelled to testify
to any facts relevant and material to the issue. Evans v. O'Connor, j74 Mass.
287; Disque v. State, 49 N. J. L. 249. As the defendant's permission to testify
may properly be granted only on condition that he clear up the whole matter,
and not prejudice the jury in his behalf by testifying on certain facts only, this
broad waiver is justified. However, concerning questions merely touching his
credibility, his privilege, ought still to exist. No concealment of pertinent facts
would thereby result, and otherwise the jury might be unfairly prejudiced by
the defendant's commission of entirely distinct crimes.
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This distinction between questions relevant to the issue and those affecting
credibility is not recognized in the principal case, though accepted by most of
the authorities. Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473; Saylor v. Com., 97 Ky. 184.
The case is further interesting for its reply to an attack by Prof. Wigmore
on the reversal in St. v. Shockley, 29 Utah, 25. In his criticism of this case
the eminent writer on evidence does not show his usual discriminating judgment.
In the Shockley case it was held reversible error to permit the state, over
defendant's objections, to question him on cross-examination respecting the commission by him of other crimes in no wise connected with the crime for which
he was on trial. It is apparent the evidence sought to be elicited by these
questions was for the sole purpose of prejudicing defendant before the jury;
and that they could not have been other than prejudicial to defendant's case.
Yet Prof. Wignore says the court "gave not even one word's consideration to
the question whether the alleged errors should have affected the verdict." The
criticism in fact does not fairly reflect the decision.
LIBEL-INNUEND.-For several ybars the plaintiff had been a subscriber to
Dun's Commercial Agency, of which the defendant was the Baltimore agent,
and during this time he had enjoyed a financial standing of from ten to twenty
thousand dollars in their publication. Upon his refusal to continue the subscription, he was given a blank rating, due as he alleged, to the malice of the
defendant. A blank rating in the key was as follows: "The absence of rating
whether of capital or credit indicates those whose business and investments
render it difficult to rate satisfactorily. We therefore prefer in justice to these
to give the detail reports on record at our offices." It was generally accepted
in trade and among subscribers that the person so rated blank was worthless as
to financial condition, untrustworthy as to character and utterly unworthy of
credit in any commercial transaction. The plaintiff's business had been seriously
injured as a result of this blank rating. A demurrer was filed. Thomas, J.,
held: "If the blank rating and accompanying explanation have acquired the
meaning and significance stated among those to whom the lists or books are sent
and the defendants, knowing that they were so understood, caused the name of
the plaintiff to be published with a blank rating for the purpose of injuring him,
the words must be taken in the sense in which they were used and in which those
to whom they were published must have understood them. Judged in that sense,
giving them that meaning, the publication if without justification was clearly
libelous, per se." DeWitt v. Scarlett, 77 Atl. 271 (Md.). The accuracy of the
decision seems indisputable.
It is interesting to note that in this case, the malice destroys all question of
privilege, Minter v. Bradstreet Co., 174 Mo. 444, on which the authorities are
somewhat at variance. (See 57 Am. Law Reg. 178.) Of the recent cases,
Mower-Hobart Co. v. R. G. Dun & Co., 131 Fed. 812, held: "communications
made by such an agency will be privileged when furnished to those having an
interest on the matter but * * * the communication will lose its privileged
character when furnished to their subscribers generally and to those having no
interest in the standing of the person as to whom the report is made." But see
Denney v. Northwestern Credit Association, io4 Pac. 769 (Wash.): "We do
not want to be understood as holding that an association of this character can
claim a report of this or any other kind to be privileged. Mercantile agencies
are not above the law and must answer for their conduct," etc.
The latter case, Denney v. N. W. Ass'n, supra, is practically analogous to
the leading case and in accord with it, the demurrer being sustained because of
insufficiency in the pleadings. Where the rating is not given in good faith, the
liability seems unquestioned.

In an action of libel for a newspaper publication, which stated that the
complainant had been arrested for reckless automobiling, accompanied by a
female companion described in the newspaper as his affinity, the plaintiff set
forth the article and alleged that it meant to charge him with being guilty of
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adultery. The trial judge had permitted him to offer in evidence several articles
from previous issues of the same paper, to prove that the newspaper had educated
its reading public into understanding the word affinity as conveying such a
meaning but on appeal, the court declared the admission of this evidence as
error, because the complainant had not alleged the word affinity had acquired
such'a new and odious meaning and was published with such meaning. Clark, J.,
laid down the following rule of law: "Where a word alleged to be libellous has
two meanings, one bad and the other good, the latter will be taken unless by
way of innuendo the bad is brought before the attention of the court. Grant v.
N. Y. Herald Co., 123 N. Y. Supp. 447.
This rule is established both in this country and in England. See in accord,
decided on similar facts Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denis N. Y. 293; Rawley v. Morbury,
I F. & F. Eng. 341; Stone v. Erison, 2o6 Pa. 6oo (I9o3); Krone v. Block, I29
S. W. (Miss. i91o) 43.
The particular vice in our principal case as pointed out by Clark, J., is the
attempt to apply an innuendo alleging adultery to a statement which may be
perfectly innocent, were it not for the possible meaning which could be attached
to the word affinity. The plaintiff failed to bring the invidious meaning of the
word squarely in issue. Had he averred such meaning in regard to the word
affinity and then alleged the defendant's intention to convey that meaning, the
defendant would have had an opportunity to traverse this intention, whereupon
the plaintiff could have properly introduced the aforementioned newspaper articles
to support his position. It is well established that an innuendo is not a statement
of fact but an inference. The statement of fact necessary in this case was
that the word affinity had acquired an invidious meaning and the inference or
innuendo, that the defendant intended to use that meaning. Here the plaintiff
omitted the averment and as a result could not prove the evil meaning of the
word affinity as was laid down in McGregor v. Gregory, 2 Dowl. N. S.769,
"Where particular English words have acquired some sense different from their
natural one, an averment, in an action for libel by way of inducement, of that
acqtired sense is necessary and an innuendo without such averment is sufficient.
MARRIAGE-PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE, -AFTER REMOVAL, UNKNOWN TO
THE PARTIES CONCERNED, OF AN IMPEDIMENT THEPETo.-Deceased married A

and lived with her for a number of years. Subsequently he left her, moved to
another state, and married B, with whom he lived for the rest of his life. He
had one child by B. Twelve years after deceased married B, A died. Neither
decedent nor B had any knowledge of the death. On the contrary, deceased
sent money to a third party for A's support, after her death. Shortly after A's
death, decedent died. B at all times in good faith believed herself to be the
lawful wife of deceased, who had always treated her as such. The lower court
held that these facts were sufficient to raise a presumption of marriage as
between deceased and B after A's death. 'On appeal the Supreme Court was
evenly divided,. and the decision of the lower court was therefore sustained. In re
Fitzgibbons' Estate, 127 N. W. 313 (-Mich., igio).
Marriage may be presumed from cohabitation and reputation. Inhabitants
of Newburyport v. Inhabitants of Boothbay, 9 Mass. 414: Myatt v. Myatt, 44
Ill.
473. Moreover, a ceremonial marriage is not necessary to establish a valid
contract of marriage after the removal of an impediment thereto, although the
intercourse was meretricious in its inception. A la'wful marriage may be presumed from the circumstances, where the parties are living together as man and
wife and holding themselves out as such to their acquaintances. Fenton v. Reed,
4 Johns. 52; Hyde v. Hyde, 3 Bradf. 5og.
The so-called presumption of marriage is, however, really an inference of
fact, to be found, if at all, by the jury. State v. Worthington, 23 Minn. 528;
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Northfield v. Plymouth, 2o Vt. 582; Fordham v. Gouverneur Village, 5 N. Y.
App. 565; Lorimer v. Lorimer, 124 Mich. 631. It is, therefore, a rebuttable
presumption, depending for its origin on the probative force of the evidence. .
1-In view of the nature of the presumption of marriage as it exists in the
law, the decision in the case under review, seems an unwarranted extension. of
the rule of public policy which requires that, wherever possible, marriages be
declared valid; and children legitimate. The jury were advised to infer from
the conduct of decedent towards B, and B's belief in the legality of her marriage,'
that a marriage had, in fact, been entered into, as soon as deiceased was, by reason
of his first wife's death, free to enter into another marriage contract. In the
face of the facts-of the case, such inference was rather violent. The deceased
did not know of the removal of the impediment to his marriage to B. Therefore
he could have had no other intent than to continue to live, as he had for years
been living, in what he well knew to be an unlawful relationship with B. On
the other hand, B never knew of the illegality of her supposed marriage, and
could not therefore have given her consent to make that which had been illegal
and void, legal and valid. Hence the inference that deceased and B entered into
a legal marriage relationship after the death of A, can be supported only by a
blind disregard of the facts of the case.
Further, as the dissenting opinion points out, to base the presumption of
marriage in such case entirely on the good faith of the party deceived, creates
the absurd possibility of having one man become, on the death of his first wife,
the lawful husband of tw6 or more women.
Sympathy for the unfortunate position of B and her child, is really the only
merit in the prevailing view of the court. But, as was said in Howd. v. Breckenridge, 97 Mich. 7o, it is not within the court's province to make a contract of
mariiage, on account of commiseration for one or contempt of the other party,
where the evidence does not show one to exist.
On the question involved in In re Fitzgibbons' Estate, the authorities are
divided. The most notable case sustaining the court's position is In re Well's
Estate, 123 N. Y. App. 79. Cases contra are Randlett v. Rice, 141 Mass. 385;
Cartwright et al. v. McGown, 121 Ill. 389; Inhabitants of Howland v.
Inhabitants of Burlington, 53 Me. 54; Barnes v. Barnes, go Iowa, 282.
The law of Pennsylvania is, that proof of a subsequent actual marriage is
necessafy in such a case. Hunt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294.
MARRIED WOMEN-CONVEYANCE FROM WIFE TO HUSBAND.-In Pennsylvania

by Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344 a married woinan is given the same right and
power to acquire and dispose of property, real, personal or mixed, and to exercise
that power in the same manner and extent as an unmarried person. The statute
requires, however, that the husband shall join in the deed of the wife.
Under this act Alexander v. Shalala, 228 Pa. 297 (19io), holds that a direct
conveyance from the wife to the husband is void even though joined'in by him.
The suit was an action of ejectment. It appeared at the trial that a woman, one
time owner of the land in question, conveyed it to her husband, he joining in the
deed as grantor and the defendants claimed under conveyance from him. In
holding the deed invalid the court says: "The common law considered the
husband and wife so nearly one that the husband could neither directly convey
to his wife, nor be a direct grantee from her. To render such a conveyance
from the wife to the husband valid, the statute must not only expressly confer
the power upon her, but it must thereby remove his common law disability,"
citing Rice v. Brandenstein, 98 Cal. 465; Johnson v. Jouchert, 124 Ind. 105;
Riley v. Wilson, 86 Tex. 240 and other cases decided under statutes requiring the
joinder of the husband in the deed. And indeed this construction seems quite
universal. In McCord v. Bright, 87 N. E. 654, a recent Indiana case, it was not
doubted that under such statute no direct conveyance could be made from wife
to husband.
In some jurisdictions, where the joinder of the husband in a deed is not
required, the opposite rule has been adopted. Savage v. Savage, 8o Me. 472;
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Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487; Robertson v. Robertson, 25 Iowa 350, but the
statutes in these states ari absolutely silent as to the husband's disability to take
as grantee from his wife. There is nothing in them that can be taken to
expressly remove that disability and in the light of these decisions the argument
of the court in the principal case does not seem to rest on the right ground. It
can hardly be doubted that were not joinder of the husband in a wife's deed
required, a direct conveyance could be made from wife to husband in Pennsylvania. It is true thatone, as grantor, cannot convey to himself as grantee, but
the court in enforcing this principle invokes to its aid the old common law
fiction of the identity of husband and wife, which the legislature had almost
completely overthrown. The rule which it has preserved seems to be one of
technicality rather than substance as a valid conveyance from wife to husband
can be made indirectly through the medium of a third person.
NEGLIGENCE.-The plaintiff, riding on the front seat of an automobile with
and by invitation of the driver, permitting the driver negligently to drive upon
a railroad crossing immediately in front of an approaching train without stopping to look or listen, and exercising no care on his part to ascertain whether
the crossing is safe, is guilty of negligence contributing to his own injury caused
by the striking of the car by the train and cannot recover therefor from the
railroad. Brommer v. P. R. R., 179 Fed. 577 (Sept., 191o). This appears to be
the first reported case where this principle, established by a long list of cases,
has been applied to those riding in automobiles. The negligence of the driver is
not imputed to the plaintiff; but the plaintiff is held answerable for his own
negligence. "A person about to cross a railroad track is under a legal duty to
stop, look and listen for approaching trains, and, failing to perform this duty,
he is guilty of such contributory negligence as will prevent his recovery for an
injury by a collision with a train at a crossing. Under this rule, one who, riding
by invitation in a vehicle in charge of another, remains in it with knowledge
that it is approaching * * * a crossing * * * without keeping any lookout
himself, and without any request to the driver to stop, is guilty of contributory
negligence." Dean v. P. R. R., 129 Pa. 514. "It is no less the duty of the
passenger, where he has the opportunity to do so, than of the driver, to learn
of the danger and to avoid it if practicable." 3 Pennewill Del. 581. "He was
certainly responsible for his own negligence. * * * He said nothing by way
of warning to the driver nor did he ask him to stop, to look and listen; and the
danger was as obvious to him as it was to the driver." Dean v. P. R. R., supra.
"It was as much his duty as that of the driver to observe the dangers, and to
avoid them, if practicable, by suggestion and protest." Davis v. Rwy., 159 Fed.
io. "It was an act of mutual negligence, for the plaintiff could have given
warning of the train and avoided it, if he had acted with the ordinary prudence
to be expected from a man in a wagon which was about to cross a railroad."
Bronk v. R. R., 5 Daly N. Y. 454.
TORTS-INDEMNITY BETwEEN TaESPASSERSi-In the case of Hoek v.
Allendale Tp. et al, 126 N. W. 987 (Mich. igo), the plaintiff was directed by
the highway commissioner to work out his road tax by plowing up certain land,
which a third party had planted. The commissioner agreed to-"stand back" of
the plaintiff if the third party made any trouble, and the plaintiff, acting in good
faith, did as directed. He thereby unwittingly committed a trespass, for which
the third party recovered of him. It was held that the plaintiff had a right of
action against the commissioner on the contract of indemnity.
It was early laid down in the law that there could be no contribution claimed
as between joint wrong doers. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186. This
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principle is limited, however, by the rule pronounced by Best, C. J., in Adamson
v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 72, that every man who employs another to do an act which
the employer appears to have a right to authorize him to do, undertakes to
indemnify him for all such acts as would be lawful, if the employer had the
authority he pretends to have.
Under this limitation of the general rule, the decision of the Michigan court
seems perfectly sound. The plaintiff's case was not only based on the implied
contract of indemnity to which, according to Best, C. J., the employer became
a party when he gave the plaintiff directions to do the work; but it was
re-enforced by the actual words of indemnity which the commissioner spoke.
There cannot, however, be a recovery on an actual contract of indemnity
where the plaintiff was employed or directed to do what he knew to be a crime,
misdemeanor, trespass or wrong; and by the doing thereof was subjected to
indictment or suit. To allow a right of action in such case would be "against
the peace and policy of the law." Holman v. Johnson, I Cowp. 341: Story on
Agency, Sec. 339.
Decisions in line with the judgment of the cdurt in Hoek v. Allendale are:
Coventry v. Barton, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 54; Howe v. Buffalo, etc., R. R., 37
N. Y. 299.
TRADE AND LABOR DISPUTES-MALICIOUS MOTIVE AFFECTING CIVIL LIA-

BmITY.-In Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills, 68 S. E. 824 (S. C. i9IO) the
plaintiff was on the black list of the defendant's strikers, which, through "mill
courtesy" was accessible to other mills. The plaintiff was prevented from
obtaining employment at other mills because of his being on this list, but was
told that he would be employed if his name was released from the list. The
plaintiff was not a striker and was wrongly on the list but the defendant refused
to remove his name. The plaintiff recovered in the court below and in overuling the defendant's objections the Supreme Court said:
"The jury might well have found a verdict for the plaintiff upon reaching
he conclusion that there was no conspiracy with other mills, but a lawful com.Aination perverted by the defendant to the injury of the plaintiff." The court
held that the working of this lawful arrangement was in this case made unlawful
as to the plaintiff through the presence of malice shown by the defendant's
refusal to withdraw the plaintiff's name from the list in which he was wrongly
included. "As a matter of law the right of employers to combine for blacklisting purposes, or of an employer to circulate a blacklist among its various
employing agents, seems to be, in the absence of malice, undoubted. But the
presence of that element (malice) according to the trend of decisions gives the
injured employee a right of action."
The decision in the case is doubtless correct, but the proposition of law on
which it is based may profitably be discussed. The proposition briefly is that a
purely malicious motive will make an act, otherwise legal, illegal. It is supported by a few well known English cases e. g. Quinn v. Leatham, A. C. 495
and has found even greater favor with American courts. In re Phelan, 62 Fed.
Rep. 8o3; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492;'Davis Watch Co. v. Robinson, 84
N. Y. Suppl. 837. The Minnesota case of Tuttle v. Buck, i7o Minn. 145 (i9o9)
applies this doctrine to facts of a truly dramatic nature. The defendant, a
banker of means, set up a barber shop for the purely malicious purpose of
enticing away the plaintiff's trade and forcing him to leave town. Recovery
was allowed.
The general trend of authority is that this proposition is sound but it is to
be regretted that the courts have framed it in such a way as to make motive the
determining question of defendant's liability. It undoubtedly derived its origin
from the well known decision of.Walker v. Cronin, io7 Mass. 555, which is
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;.ccepted law, and unconfused by an over-theoretical presentation. "Any act the
natural result of which is an injury to a particular person, knowingly done by
one person, and resulting in injury to the other, renders the actor liable to the
injured person, unless the actor has a just cause and excuse." This proposition
would have disposed of all the cases in which the other has been invoked, and it
is to be regretted that the courts have seen fit further to refine so clear and
comprehensive a statement of the law. Yet if malice be taken in the every day
sense and defined as "want of just cause and excuse," the propositions are
essentially the same.

